REPUBLISHED

An entirely private island: The real scale of the Sazan project

Erblin Vukaj · Originally published: 3 March 2026

Prime Minister Edi Rama is negotiating over Sazan, an Albanian asset, through an arbitrary approach based primarily on personal relationships in the service of power, bypassing legal and institutional standards.

Since 2024, when Jared Kushner, the son-in-law of US President Donald Trump, announced his interest in turning the island into a private luxury resort, the public narrative around Sazan has been filled with promises of economic development, elite investment and an enhanced image for the country.

But after two years, the balance sheet is this: Kushner has gained free marketing for his international real-estate portfolio. Rama has gained goodwill and closeness to the Trump family, strengthening his political position at home. Albanians and the Albanian state itself, meanwhile, have gained nothing concrete.

Quite the opposite. Another dangerous precedent has been set: part of the country’s territory is being offered for development without competition, transparency or clear legal and economic guarantees.

Documents obtained by Citizens.al show that negotiations are formally taking place within institutions and have been extended indefinitely since 13 November 2025. Officially, there is no plan for Zvërnec, while the plans show that the entire island of Sazan will be privatized, in contrast to the initial narrative that “only 8% of its area” would be affected.

In fact, 45.6 hectares, or 8% of the 570 hectares of land, is the area that buildings will occupy, while the project shows Sazan becoming a private island.

The real scale of the proposed project

So far, the public has seen only three images published by Jared Kushner on 15 March 2024 on X: villas scattered across Sazan’s slopes and a vision of large-scale construction over the Zvërnec wetland. They have circulated in almost every report about the proposal.

But the project’s phasing overview map, which Citizens.al has obtained, shows a different reality for the island’s future.

According to the documents examined, Sazan is proposed to be divided into three broad regions, organized by development phase, with around 448,000 m² of construction for approximately 970 residential and hotel units. The island is conceived as an integrated whole, with its entire road and circulation network serving the developments.

The first phase privatizes the island’s heart: the port and central area, precisely Sazan’s functional hub, which currently contains the old buildings of former military units and is the island’s only entry point.

The “Marina Area” envisages 1,000 m² of amenities and 18,000 m² of service space. Around it, “North Valley” envisages 39,000 m² of construction, with 56 villas and 11 apartments, or condos.

“South Valley” adds 22,000 m² with 144 hotel villas. “Central Ridge” envisages 63,000 m² with 56 villas and 26 condos. “West Valley” includes 8,000 m² with 25 hotel villas, while “West Estates” adds 5,000 m² with eight private residences.

This first phase does not look like a pilot. It establishes the foundations of a complete residential and hotel infrastructure that turns the island’s centre into a functionally closed complex.

The second phase spreads across the slopes and coastal edges. Development expands to the northern and southern ends and into the island’s hills, with larger properties that appear to be offered as residences.

“North Point” includes 30,000 m² with 35 villas. “North Ridge Estate” adds 35,000 m² with 35 estates. “West Estates” envisages 23,000 m² with 20 estates; “South Ridge Estates”, 14,000 m² with 13 estates; and “South Point”, 18,000 m² with 16 villas.

This phase affects precisely the scenic areas and slopes with the highest landscape value. From a development perspective, these appear to be the project’s “Premium” segments. From a public perspective, they are the parts that have so far remained open, untouched natural spaces.

The project continues with a third phase left as an option for further expansion. This is also the most revealing aspect: labelled “Potential Future Phase”, it concentrates a more substantial development west of the port area.

It envisages 172,000 m² of development with 525 units, meaning apartments.

This single figure changes the scale of the discussion. If implemented, the third phase would take the island towards a building density that effectively uses up all the space available for other projects.

In territorial planning terms, this means Sazan is proposed as a single, exclusive development, with no room for other public or private initiatives outside the project.

The initial narrative of “8% of the area”, which created the impression of a limited intervention, therefore looks quite different when set against this proposed map. The project is not confined to one corner of the island; it extends through the centre, along the ridges and to the coastal edges.

Even if the construction-to-total-area ratio remains a formal measure, the pattern of development shows that the island will function as a single private complex.

Under this plan, Sazan is more than a resort. It is a territory designed for exclusive, integrated use, centralized under a single operator.

And this ought to shift the debate from “what percentage will be built on” to the question: “what will actually remain public?”

The negotiating group exists only as a “formality”

Citizens.al has learned that the negotiating group which discussed and signed documents concerning Sazan between 13 January and 27 October 2025 met a total of ten times.

The nine-member group consisted of:

• Elira Kokona, head of the Albanian Investment Corporation (KISH);
• Ermal Nufi, now defence minister, then a representative of the deputy prime minister’s office;
• Sofjan Jaupaj, now environment minister, then deputy minister of tourism and environment;
• Ami Kozeli, now director of the Albanian Road Authority (ARRSH), then deputy minister of infrastructure and energy;
• Enkelejd Musabelliu, deputy minister of economy, culture and innovation;
• Eldi Çondi, chief of staff at the Ministry of Finance;
• Aleks Marku, secretary at the Ministry of Defence;
• Alban Binaj, administrator of Albanian Seasports Development (ASD);
• Fiona Beqiri, project manager at the Albanian Investment Development Agency (AIDA).

The group was established as a technical body following the Strategic Investment Committee’s decision at the end of 2024 granting strategic-investor status to Kushner’s proposal.

In theory, this is the standard mechanism: the state creates a negotiating body and uses it to discuss terms with the investor. In practice, however, the documents show something else.

The list of meetings includes presentations, action plans, discussions of a memorandum of understanding and, finally, discussions about extending the negotiations deadline.

There is no clear published record of intensive joint meetings with the investor. There are no minutes documenting substantive negotiations over the territory, usage rights or financial obligations.

According to AIDA, the investor was represented “through official channels” by Asher Abehsera as administrator. But it does not specify which legal entity he represented, and the authorization documents have not been published.

This leaves open the possibility that negotiations were conducted mainly through correspondence or other informal mediation, possibly involving a local representative or associate who may have preliminary contracts to participate as a subcontractor in developing the project.

Outside the institutions, meanwhile, media reports describe much more intensive engagement: visits, lunches, dinners and high-level receptions at which the project was discussed with Prime Minister Rama directly present.

In this dual arrangement, the technical group looks more like a procedural device for meeting a legal obligation, while the real decisions appear to depend on the prime minister’s whims and the progress of his personal relationships with Trump’s relatives.

Negotiations without a deadline or an explanation

Negotiations over Sazan’s development were supposed to conclude on 13 November 2025, but the deadline was missed and extended indefinitely. AIDA acknowledged to Citizens.al that the extension had been made “by agreement between the parties”, but gave no specific reasons and no new end date, despite Citizens.al’s insistence.

In strategic-investment negotiations, extensions are usually linked to real obstacles such as the land’s legal status, ownership disputes, geological conditions or financial disagreements. None of these reasons, however, has been mentioned.

Meanwhile, it is known that the island lacks basic infrastructure: water and electricity are absent, both essential to sustainable development.

AIDA states that the details will be made public only once the agreement is finalized. In other words, citizens will be informed after Rama has served the next dinner and the decision has become practically irreversible.

Officially, AIDA states that the project covers only Sazan and that there is no application for Zvërnec. Nevertheless, during January, the delegation associated with Ivanka Trump also visited that area and held a meeting with architects and senior officials.

Why, then, is an area that “is not part of the project” included in the itinerary of these receptions? Either Zvërnec is being used to broaden the development narrative and amplify Jared Kushner’s portfolio, in other words, as marketing, or a parallel plan exists that has not yet been formalized.

In either case, public communication does not match the official documents, and the losers are once again Albanian citizens, institutions and the rule of law.

The Territorial Development Agency (AZHT) acknowledged to Citizens.al that its representatives were present at events held during Ivanka Trump’s visit to Vlorë. But the agency stressed that its role was to provide “institutional guidance”, that it “was not the organizer” and that it “does not know who organized the event”.

This creates a paradox. A state institution attends an event connected to a strategic investment in the territory, yet lacks basic information about its organizer or structure.

In practice, this suggests an abusive and highly arbitrary model of decision-making in which private meetings have the state’s presence but none of its administrative accountability.

Investment diplomacy and the “House of Trump”

The Sazan story goes beyond a tourism project. It concerns how Albania, a candidate for European Union membership, manages public assets and builds relationships with powerful international actors.

Open competition and transparency in managing public property are among the EU’s fundamental standards. The Sazan project is the result of direct negotiation rather than an international competition.

In other cases involving unsolicited proposals, at least a formal competition has been opened. With Sazan, after two years, negotiations are still continuing without an end.

In a region where international support is seen as a guarantee of political security, investments can also take on a diplomatic dimension. But this raises a fundamental question: Is economic development being used as an instrument for political closeness? If so, at what price?

Because the debate is no longer only about a resort. It is about how a small state negotiates with major actors: by following the law and open, competitive procedures, or through privileged relationships promising not only capital, but also proximity to the power of the “House of Trump”.

In the end, who will enjoy this political closeness, and how long will it last? Will it benefit the Albanian state or the current prime minister?